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COMMENTS
THE EXISTENCE OF A DUTY IN WISCONSIN
NEGLIGENCE CASES
The existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defen-
dant is one of the four basic elements required to establish
liability in a negligence action, i.e., duty, breach, cause and
harm.' Obviously, if no duty exists, there can be no negligence
on the part of the plaintiff and, hence, no liability. Although
easily articulated,' the concept of duty as a limitation upon
legal responsibility has created confusion in those negligence
cases which predicate liability upon the existence of a duty
owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. This theory was originally
adopted by Justice Cardozo in the majority opinion of Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad3 to judicially limit liability in those
cases where such a limitation was deemed necessary.
In recent years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has at-
tempted to alter this traditional concept of duty as a liability
limiting tool by expressly adopting the rationale of the dissent-
ing opinion in Palsgraf written by Justice Andrews, rather than
the majority opinion. This comment will investigate the extent
and validity of that alteration, and discuss the concept of duty
as a limitation upon liability as it exists in Wisconsin today.
I. THE PALSGRAF OPINIONS
Any discussion of duty as a liability limiting technique in
negligence actions necessarily starts with an analysis of
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRm § 30 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 281 (1965). See also Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,
74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976); Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 191 N.W.2d
872 (1971). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has summarized that
[Eto constitute a cause of action for negligence there must be:
(1) A duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct to protect others against
unreasonable risks;
(2) a failure to conform to the required standard;
(3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and
(4) actual loss or damage as a result of the injury.
Id. at 144,191 N.W.2d at 873-74.
2. See, e.g., A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214
N.W.2d 764, 766 (1974) (defendant's contention).
3. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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Palsgraf, which is, without question, the leading case in the
area. The facts are well known, but worth repeating: a man,
carrying an innocuous package, was running to board the de-
fendant railroad's departing train. One of the defendant's
guards assisted the hurrying passenger by pushing him while
another guard pulled him onto the train. In the process, the
package, which contained fireworks, was jostled from his grasp,
fell to the ground, and exploded. The explosion caused a scale
at the end of a platform to fall on Mrs. Palsgraf, who was
standing on the platform some distance away. Mrs. Palsgraf
sued the railroad for damages.'
This unique factual situation produced a divided court and
two noteworthy opinions. Justice Cardozo, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that the defendant's employees were not neg-
ligent in the first instance, because the defendant railroad did
not owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf. According to Cardozo, negli-
gence is not a tort unless it involves the commission of a wrong,
which is the violation of a protected interest. However, that
violation of the plaintiff's interest must be foreseeable to the
defendant to constitute negligence. In other words, if the injury
to the plaintiff is not foreseeable, the defendant does not owe
the plaintiff a duty to refrain from negligent conduct, and there
is no liability, or negligence, because there is no wrong. "In
every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given
act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the
individual complaining, the observance of which would have
averted or avoided the injury."5 In this instance, the plaintiff
was denied recovery because the defendant could not foresee
harm to her arising from the actual conduct which occurred.
In his dissent, Justice Andrews took issue with Cardozo's
foreseeable plaintiff requirement, emphasizing the element of
proximate cause rather than duty. Under this analysis, negli-
gence exists whenever the defendant performs an unreasonable
act which invades the protected interest of another, whether or
not damage actually occurs. The duty owed by the defendant
is one of due care to protect society as a whole from these
unreasonable acts. In essence,
[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of
4. Id. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99.
5. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 99-100.
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others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom
harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who
is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally
be thought the danger zone. . . .Harm to someone being the
natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those
in fact injured may complain.'
The only limitation of liability under his general duty owed
to the whole world is the requirement of proximate cause; that
is, the damages must have been proximately or directly caused
by the ureasonable act. Justice Andrews admitted that proxi-
mate cause is impossible to adequately define and that the
court, based upon considerations of "public policy" and a
"rough sense of justice" must arbitrarily refuse to extend caus-
ation and liability beyond a certain point.
Both opinions clearly have a central theme: at some point,
the court must make a public policy decision which operates
to limit the defendant's liability for damages caused by the
negligent act. Cardozo sought to limit liability at the outset
with a judicial analysis of the foreseeability of harm to a partic-
ular plaintiff. A lack of foreseeable harm to that plaintiff pre-
cludes liability, regardless of any actual negligent acts or dam-
ages. On the other hand, Andrews established a duty of due
care owed to the whole world, and, if anyone is injured as a
result of conduct breaching that duty, the negligent defendant
is liable unless the injuries were too remote and, therefore, not
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct.
Apparently, the key distinction between the two opinions is
the time at which the limitation is invoked, rather than the
methods employing the limitation, since both methods are
admittedly founded upon considerations of public policy. Ac-
cording to Cardozo, the court makes the decision in the first
instance which could conceivably arise upon a motion to dis-
miss or a motion for summary judgment based simply on the
pleadings.7 Under the Andrews theory, the jury first determines
the elements of negligence, including causation, and the ver-
dict is subject to review for a possible judicial limitation, unless
the jury itself refused to extend liability due to a lack of the
requisite causation.
6. Id. at 350, 162 N.E. at 103.
7. The PaIsgraf case had gone to trial, and was heard by the New York Court of
Appeals on the defendant's appeal from a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
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i. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
A. Adoption of the Cardozo Majority Opinion
Obviously, some judicial mechanism is needed by the
courts to limit liability in cases where, in the court's opinion,
liability simply should not be imposed regardless of the defen-
dant's negligent conduct. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
search of such a mechanism, adopted the Cardozo majority
opinion in Waube v. Warrington.' The limitation adopted in
Waube had been foreshadowed in Osborne v. Montgomery.' In
Osborne the court had recognized the need for such a mecha-
nism, saying that:
The fundamental idea of liability for wrongful acts is that
upon a balancing of the social interests involved in each case,
the law determines that under the circumstances of a particu-
lar case an actor should or should not become liable for the
natural consequences of his conduct.
Any rule which operates to limit liability for a wrongful
act must be derived from judicial policy and its limits cannot
be defined by any formula capable of automatic application
but must rest in the sound discretion of the court."°
Waube provided the court with the ideal factual setting for
the application of the Cardozo opinion. Mrs. Waube, while
looking out of a window of her house, observed the defendant's
automobile strike and kill her daughter. She became extremely
hysterical, took sick, and subsequently died. The decedent's
husband then brought suit against the driver of the car."
The necessity of judicially limiting liability in such extreme
cases was analyzed from the standpoint of the specific duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The court rejected the
Palsgraf minority's reliance on causation, reasoning that liabil-
ity should not be incurred as a result of extending the harm
produced by defendant's negligent acts through all possible
pathways of causation. Rather, the defendant's duty was to
exercise reasonable care and avoid injuring those plaintiffs to
whom harm was reasonably foreseeable, or, in this case, Mrs.
Waube's daughter. Under these circumstances, the defendant
8. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
9. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
10. Id. at 232, 237, 234 N.W. at 376.
11. 216 Wis. at 603-04, 258 N.W. at 497.
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could not foresee harm to the mother sitting some distance
away in her livingroom. Therefore, liability was precluded be-
cause of the "unusual and extraordinary" facts of this case. To
find a duty extending to the mother under these circumstances
would impose liability "wholly out of proportion to the culpa-
bility of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable
burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent
claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point." 2
B. Rejection of the Cardozo Majority Opinion
In Waube the court justifiably employed Cardozo's foresee-
able plaintiff requirement as a limitation of liability, both be-
cause of the remoteness or unforeseeability of the plaintiff from
the actual negligent conduct of the defendant and the tenuous
nature of the plaintiff's invaded interest, i.e., shock and fear for
another's safety rather than her own. The stated policy factors
were thereby used to judicially establish the extent of the de-
fendant's liability when considered in conjunction with the
plaintiff's right of recovery. However, in subsequent cases, the
court was faced with the situation where these same public
policy considerations applied, but the factual situation was
such that harm to the particular plaintiff was reasonably fore-
seeable to the defendant.
Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc.1 3 presented the
court with just such a situation. The plaintiff was a patron in
the defendant's theatre when he was struck in the eye by an
anonymously thrown spitball. The jury held that the defendant
was negligent in patrolling the premises, but such negligence
was not a direct cause of the injury. In dicta,' 4 the court dis-
cussed the necessity of a judicial mechanism to limit liability.
The discussion focused on the foreseeable plaintiff requirement
of the Palsgraf majority opinion, and recognized its essential
thrust as being primarily that of public policy: "Logic seems
to be on the side of the dissenting opinion, yet the majority
opinion can be justified from the standpoint that judicial pol-
icy warranted the result. The conscience of society might be
12. Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
13. 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952).
14. The supreme court had already found error in the trial court's instruction which
intermingled foreseeability with the causation instruction.
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shocked by imposing liability in such a case."' 5 However, any
such limitation of liability forces the court to arbitrarily cate-
gorize the plaintiff as unforeseeable despite the obvious fore-
seeability of harm in this instance to patrons of the theatre.
The implication of this dictum casts disfavor on the Waube
rationale.
After the Pfeifer decision, the court lacked a clear method
for judicially limiting liability. Waube stood as clear precedent
for the Cardozo opinion, but Pfeifer seemed to discredit that
reliance on the Palsgraf majority. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas
Light Co.'" squarely addressed the Cardozo and Waube "no-
duty" approach. As in Pfeifer, Klassa involved a plaintiff who
was foreseeable to the defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant, while installing a gas regulator in Mrs. Klassa's
home, negligently allowed gas to escape, ignite, and cause a fire
in the basement. The plaintiffs, Mrs. Klassa and her sister,
and two of Mrs. Klassa's sons were all in the home at the time.
The plaintiffs claimed that their injuries arose from shock and
fear for their own safety. The defendant argued that the plain-
tiffs were not in personal danger from the explosion, but rather
had suffered the resulting shock and fear from anxiety over the
safety of the two sons in the basement. 17
The claim for relief in Klassa was quite similar to that of
Waube, with one major exception. The plaintiffs' physical posi-
tion in the home at the time of the explosion was such that the
defendant could readily foresee injury to them arising from the
negligent installation of the gas regulator. To judicially pre-
clude liability under the Waube doctrine, the court would have
been forced, as in Pfeifer, to arbitrarily negate the obvious
foreseeability of the plaintiffs in order to comply with the fore-
seeability limitations of the Palsgraf majority. Recognizing this
inconsistency, the court categorized Waube simply as a deci-
sion grounded upon public policy, regardless of the means ac-
tually used to limit liability. "Whenever a court holds that a
certain act does not constitute negligence because there was no
duty owed by the actor to the injured party, although the act
complained of caused the injury, such court is making a public
15. 262 Wis. at 239, 55 N.W.2d at 34.
16. 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).




This rationalization of Waube was necessary to minimize
the "no-duty" holding without discrediting the basic rule of the
case, i. e., prohibiting recovery for emotional distress and/or
shock caused solely by the fear of personal injury to the person
or property of another when there was no actual physical im-
pact to the person seeking damages. As a result, recovery was
denied in Klassa based on the substantive case law established
in Waube, rather than the "no-duty" limitation contained
therein.
C. Development of the Public Policy Doctrine
With the Klassa and Pfeifer decisions, the court succeeded
in distinguishing the foreseeable plaintiff limitation of the
Palsgraf majority out of Wisconsin case law, recognizing that
it strained the accepted definitions of duty to preclude liability
on grounds of foreseeability when harm to the plaintiff was in
fact foreseeable under the existing circumstances. Cardozo's
foreseeable plaintiff theory only functioned well in unique fac-
tual situations, such as Palsgraf and Waube. It did not provide
a good limiting mechanism in "ordinary" negligence cases
which because of their nature, required a judicial limitation of
liability. A series of these "ordinary" cases'" followed Kassa,
laying the foundation for a new limitation mechanism in Wis-
consin, based on general public policy considerations instead
of the Palsgraf theories.
The fundamental theory of limiting liability via public pol-
18. Id. at 183, 77 N.W.2d at 401 (emphasis in original). Dean Prosser has suggested
this analysis:
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution,
is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that
there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question ...
The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be
imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events; beyond
that it serves none.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. Rav. 1, 15 (1953).
19. See, e.g., Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957); Longberg v.
H.L. Green Co., 15 Wis. 2d 505, 113 N.W.2d 129, aff'd on rehearing, 114 N.W.2d 435
(1962); Ide v. Wamser, 22 Wis. 2d 325, 126 N.W.2d 59 (1964); Schilling v. Stockel, 26
Wis. 2d 525, 133 N.W.2d 335 (1965); Meihost v. Meihost, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 137 N.W.2d
395 (1966); Cirillo v. City of Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 2d 705, 150 N.W.2d 460 (1967);
Johnson v. Chemical Supply Co., 38 Wis. 2d 194, 156 N.W.2d 455 (1968); Scheeler v.
Bahr, 41 Wis. 2d 473, 164 N.W.2d 310 (1969); Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44
Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969); Kornitz v. Earling & Hiller, Inc., 49 Wis. 2d 97,
181 N.W.2d 403 (1970).
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icy considerations can be traced back to the Osborne and
Waube decisions. In fact, several early decisions dismissed the
Waube reliance on Cardozo as simply being another means of
expressing the public policy rationale: "In Klassa v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co. we reaffirmed the decision of the Waube Case,
as grounded on sound considerations of public policy, pointing
out again that the Palsgraf determination of lack of duty to
plaintiff was itself a judicial determination of policy."2
The general guidelines for limiting liability through public
policy considerations were outlined in Colla v. Mandella,21
wherein the court refused to limit the defendant's liability after
discussing these policy considerations. In Colla, after being
parked at the top of a hill, the defendant's truck rolled down
the incline and struck the plaintiff's home, causing slight dam-
age to the house. The plaintiff, asleep inside, was rudely awak-
ened, aggravating a pre-existing heart condition which resulted
in his death ten days later. The trial court denied the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, and the supreme court
affirmed, emphasizing that a determination of the existence of
liability should not be made upon a judicial declaration of a
lack of duty, but rather upon the stated public policy consider-
ations, which were not sufficiently present in this case:
It is recognized by this and other courts that even when the
chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery against
the negligent tort-feasor may sometimes be denied on
grounds of public policy because the injury is too remote from
the negligence or too "wholly out of proportion to the culpa-
bility of the negligent tortfeasor," or in retrospect it appears
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have
brought about the harm, or because allowance of recovery
would place too unreasonable a burden upon users of the
highway, or be too likely to open the way to fraudulent
claims, or would "enter a field that has no sensible or just
stopping point. ' '2
Schilling v. Stockel2 firmly established these public policy
20. Longberg v. H.L. Green Co., 15 Wis. 2d 505, 515, 113 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1962)
(footnote omitted).
21. 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
22. Id. at 598-99, 85 N.W.2d at 348. The Colla decision cites Patsgraf as the leading
case standing for the proposition that liability should be limited in some situations for
public policy reasons.
23. 26 Wis. 2d 525, 133 N.W.2d 335 (1965).
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factors as being a viable liability limiting mechanism. The
plaintiff was driving with his left elbow extended out the open
window of his car. A large crate blew off the defendant's pass-
ing truck and injured the plaintiff's arm. The jury found both
parties to be fifty percent negligent, barring any recovery by
the plaintiff.24 The court recognized that the jury was entitled
to find the plaintiff negligent in this instance, but, through
judicial recognition of the existing public policy factors, he was
not to be held accountable for that negligence. 25 This was one
of those "unusual cases" when a judicial limitation is necessary
to protect a party from the effects of his negligent conduct:
When the court determines that liability should not at-
tach even though a negligent act has been committed, our
decisions since 1952 direct that nonliability be based on con-
siderations of public policy rather than couched in terms of
an absence of duty.
We cannot hold Mr. Schilling's conduct to be nonnegli-
gent as a matter of law or hold that there was no duty on his
part to use reasonable care. Nevertheless, upon these facts,
public policy precludes the attachment of liability for his
conduct."
Several later cases27 adopted the public policy considera-
tions advanced in Colla and Schilling, firmly establishing that
theory as the dominant judicial limiting mechanism in Wiscon-
24. At that time, recovery was allowed only if the plaintiff's negligence was "not
as great" as that of the defendant. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1965).
25. 26 Wis. 2d at 534, 133 N.W.2d at 339. The Schilling decision traced the history
of the foreseeable plaintiff requirement and its interrelationship with duty:
Commencing in 1952, with Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., we
ruled on a number of cases in which we rejected "the no-duty formula of Palsgraf
and Waube ... " Duty is still an important factor in determining whether an
act is negligent. However, once an act has been found to be negligent, we no
longer look to see if there was a duty to the one who was in fact injured.
Id. at 531, 133 N.W.2d at 338 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 532-34, 133 N.W.2d at 339. See also Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724,
176 N.W.2d 566 (1970) (applying policy factors in refusing to extend the liability of a
tavernkeeper to include injuries sustained by a guest in a drunken patron's car);
Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 203 N.W.2d 15 (1973) (sustaining against a public
policy argument a complaint which alleged that the defendant negligently allowed the
plaintiff to lay a loaded gun on the ground close to two excitable hunting dogs); 74
Wis. 2d 46, 245 N.W.2d 915 (1976) (denying recovery in the second appeal of the same
case upon the plaintiff's failure to prove the foreseeability of the injury at trial).
27. See cases cited in note 19 supra.
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sin, as opposed to the court's earlier reliance in Waube on the
Palsgraf majority theory.
D. A.E. Investment and the Palsgraf Minority
In A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.,21 Justice
Heffernan analyzed the cases relying on public policy and de-
cided that in reality they adopted the Paisgraf minority opin-
ion. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant build-
ers and architects were negligent in the construction and design
of a building in which the plaintiff was a tenant. The defendant
architects demurred to the complaint and subsequently ap-
pealed from the order overruling the demurrer, denying respon-
sibility for the plaintiff's economic loss on the theory that no
duty was owed to the plaintiff, and hence the complaint failed
to state a cause of action.29
The court ruled that architects, as a class, may be liable for
negligence to third persons occupying a building designed by
them, even in the absence of privity of contract between the
architect and tenant. The lack of contractual privity in and of
itself was not a sufficient public policy justification to deny
liability. Furthermore, an analysis of the duty actually owed by
the architects revealed that
[t]he duty of any person is the obligation of due care to
refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to
others even though the nature of that harm and the identity
of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the
time of the act. This is the view of the minority in
Palsgraf. . . . This court, by implication at least, adopted
that view in Pfeifer. . . and expressly adopted the Palsgraf
minority rationale in Klassa.3 0
Thus, the Pfeifer and Klassa decisions were construed as
adopting the Palsgraf minority opinion. As a result, duty is
defined in the terms of the minority, and exists when
it can be said that it was foreseeable that [the defendant's]
act or omission to act may cause harm to someone. A party
is negligent when he commits an act when some harm to
28. 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).
29. Id. at 481-83, 214 N.W.2d at 765-66.
30. Id. at 483, 214 N.W.2d at 766 (citations omitted). The court noted that
"[diuty is still an important factor in determining whether an act is negligent ...
However, once an act has been found to be negligent, we no longer look to see if there
was a duty to the one who was in fact injured." Id. at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766.
[Vol. 61:447
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someone is foreseeable. Once negligence is established, the
defendant is liable for unforeseeable consequences as well as
foreseeable ones. In addition, he is liable to unforeseeable
plaintiffs."
This definition of duty is historically correct, although reli-
ance on the Palsgraf minority is misplaced for two reasons. In
the first place, the discussion of Palsgraf in A.E. Investment
was primarily dicta, because the appellant's claim of no duty
was based on the lack of privity, and that argument was re-
jected on other grounds. Secondly, and more importantly, the
facts in this case placed the court in the same dilemma which,
except for Waube, had fostered the original defection from the
Cardozo opinion: the injured plaintiff was clearly foreseeable
under the alleged facts. 2 The Palsgraf majority "foreseeable
plaintiff" could not be invoked to limit liability in this case, as
in the others, without arbitrarily and artificially declaring a
foreseeable plaintiff to be unforeseeable. Waube remains the
only "unique" factual situation in Wisconsin to parallel
Palsgraf and constitute a truly unforeseeable plaintiff.
The A.E. Investment decision confused elements of foresee-
ability in determining negligence and rejecting the unforeseea-
ble plaintiff theory. Wisconsin has never deviated from the rule
that an act must foreseeably cause harm to someone before it
is considered a negligent act.33 This aspect of the foreseeability
of harm is another fundamental requirement of negligence.
However in Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo created an independent
judicial limitation by requiring the existence of a foreseeable
plaintiff before any determination of negligence is made.
Therefore, under the Cardozo scheme, before the remaining
elements of negligence are considered, the defendant's conduct
must have: (a) injured a foreseeable plaintiff, and (b) been the
type of act or omission which the defendant could reasonably
foresee as resulting in harm to someone within that judicially
31. Id. at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766.
32. Harm to the tenants of a negligently constructed building was certainly foresee-
able to the architect of that building.
33. Every person is negligent when, without intending to do any wrong, he
does such an act or omits to take such a precaution that under the circumstances
present he, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably to foresee that he
will thereby expose the interests of another to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379 (1931) (emphasis




established circle of foreseeable plaintiffs. If the court initially
determines that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff,
then there can be no liability. The foreseeability of harm to
someone arising from the defendant's actions does not matter,
because the actual determination of negligence, i.e., duty owed
and breach of that duty, is never made.
Justice Heffernan mistakenly considered the second deter-
mination of duty (the foreseeability of harm to someone) to be
the central theme of the Andrews dissenting opinion. Such is
not the case. Both the majority and the minority of Palsgraf are
concerned with the same result-limiting liability. Cardozo
judicially performed this function at the initial stage of the
negligence formula, before any determination of the existence
of a negligent act is actually made.
On the other hand, the Andrews dissent limited liability
through causation. The only limitation on liability is the ne-
cessity of a proximate causal connection, or substantial factor,
between the negligent act and the injury. In essence, the defen-
dant owes a duty to the whole world, which is identical to the
duty existing in the majority opinion, after the policy determi-
nation requiring a foreseeable plaintiff has been made. Once
the defendant has acted negligently, which is determined be-
fore any limitation of liability, then the defendant is liable to
anyone whose injuries were proximately caused by those acts
or omissions.
The A. E. Investment decision incorrectly attempted to dis-
tinguish the concept of duty in the two Palsgraf opinions with-
out recognizing that Cardozo was concerned with a duty to
foreseeable plaintiffs only at the initial stage of the negligence
formula. Once Cardozo judicially established these parameters
of foreseeability, the defendant owed a duty to all persons
within those parameters, because all such persons were foresee-
able. In the minority opinion, Justice Andrews chose to limit
liability on the basis of proximate or direct cause, with the
limits of causation being determined by the jury. In defining
and limiting the elusive definition of causation, Andrews relied
upon the naturalness or foreseeability of the harm arising from
the negligent act:
[Tihe natural results of a negligent act-the results which
a prudent man would or should foresee-do have a bearing
upon the decision as to proximate cause.
[Vol. 61:447
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[S]urely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great
foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure
one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than
was the plaintiff. . . .Whether by flying fragments, by bro-
ken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could
say. But injury in some form was most probable.m
Under this theory, liability follows the negligent act if the req-
uisite causation is present. Any decision to limit liability is
made by the jury when determining proximate cause, rather
than by the court prior to the determination of negligence.
Elements of foreseeability enter into the determination of caus-
ation, rather than into the determination of duty owed. In
either theory, the defendant's liability is limited by foresee-
ability.
Wisconsin, on the other hand, has clearly eliminated all
elements of foreseeability from the determination of proximate
cause (substantial factor) in negligence cases.15 "If it be kept
in mind that foreseeability under our law as it now stands
applies only to the question of negligence or the failure to exer-
cise ordinary care, and not to limit the liability for the conse-
quences of the wrongful act, much confusion should be done
away with."3 In other words, if a duty and breach are found
to be present, then the defendant is responsible for all conse-
quential damages flowing from the breach, whether or not the
damages were foreseeable, provided there was no break in the
chain of causation.
This interpretation of causation quite literally results in
liability for any injury caused, even if remotely, by the defen-
dant's acts. Causation therefore does not and cannot provide a
sound basis for limiting liability. Because of this, the Wiscon-
sin court has formulated and adhered to a system of limitation
founded upon considerations of public policy rather than the
Palsgraf minority view.
E. Post-A.E. Investment Adherence to Public Policy
Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc.,37 was decided in the
34. 248 N.Y. at 355-56, 162 N.E. at 104-05.
35. See Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 429, 114 N.W.2d 823, 827
(1962); see also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 234-35, 55
N.W.2d 29, 32 (1952); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379
(1931).
36. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379 (1931).
37. 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383, aff'd on rehearing, 219 N.W.2d 576 (1974).
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same term as the A.E. Investment case. In Howard, the same
public policy considerations were utilized to limit the defen-
dant's liability. An intern at the defendant hospital had broken
a catheter when inserting it into the plaintiff's shoulder. Two
small pieces could not be located, and hence were not removed.
The plaintiff developed a phobia, fearing the future develop-
ment of cancer as a result of this admittedly negligent conduct.
However, the public policy factors of Cotta were invoked by the
court to preclude liability. These factors were simply charac-
terized as an element of causation and, hence, were inserted
into the negligence formula at that particular point in the de-
termination of negligence. The court noted that in Colla and
other cases, "these public policy considerations are regarded as
an element of the legal cause, although not a part of the deter-
minations of cause in fact, which this court refers to as
'substantial factor'."' '
Although several decisions subsequent to Howard have
cited the A.E. Investment rationale, 9 they actually do little
more than recite the definition of duty stated therein. None of
these decisions make any attempt to actually apply the
Palsgraf minority opinion. Therefore, in spite of A.E.
Investment and several statements to the contrary, Wisconsin
firmly adheres to the public policy theory of limiting liability.
Howard clearly included these public policy considerations
as an element of causation. Although considered a part of the
general scheme of causation, the policy factors are not involved
in determining cause in fact or substantial factor causation.
38. Id. at 518-19, 217 N.W.2d at 385.
39. See, e.g., Ceplina v. South Milwaukee School Bd., 73 Wis. 2d 338, 342, 243
N.W.2d 183, 185 (1976); DeBauche v. Knott, 69 Wis. 2d 119, 123-24, 230 N.W.2d 158,
161 (1975). One case almost merges the Andrews dissent with the public policy ap-
proach:
By such standard of ordinary care, we mean the standard that is used in all other
negligence cases in Wisconsin. . . .Under that test, as we have repeatedly
stated, negligence is to be determined by ascertaining whether the defendant's
exercise of care foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others. That test is
to be applied at the negligence phase of the analysis to the world at large and
not to the particular plaintiff. In this respect, our analysis of negligence does
not follow the Cardozo majority opinion in Palsgraf. . . .We rather rely upon
the Andrews dissenting rationale that, if the defendant has been negligent under
that standard, the question is one of cause-substantial factor, i.e., cause in fact,
and proximate cause, which may include policy factors that may exclude liabil-
ity in the particular circumstances.
Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 857, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975).
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The defendant's negligence must be a substantial factor in
producing the injuries claimed by the defendant in order for
liability to attach." There may, in some cases, be more than
one substantial factor causing the injuries, and in that case, the
comparative negligence formula weighs and allocates the per-
centage of total cause to each factor.41 This causal relationship
is a necessary prerequisite to establishing any liability for the
plaintiff's injuries.
Determinations of cause in fact and public policy are neces-
sarily separate, since public policy considerations operate to
preclude liability in instances where the defendant's negligent
conduct is found to be a substantial factor in producing the
plaintiff's injuries:
[N]egligence plus an unbroken sequence of events establish-
ing cause-in-fact does not necessarily lead to a determination
that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries. The
determination to not impose liability [because of remoteness
of cause] in instances where a negligent act has been com-
mitted and the act is a "substantial factor" in causing the
injury rests upon considerations of public policy. 2
Therefore, public policy factors are invoked to limit liability
in cases where all elements of negligence are present. Howard
correctly characterized this limitation as an element of causa-
tion, simply because the factors, as enunciated in Colla, go
primarily to the remoteness of the injury from the actual con-
duct, regardless of cause. Although A.E. Investment and its
progeny correctly restate the theory of duty in Wisconsin as it
has existed over the years, any reliance on the Palsgraf minor-
ity to limit liability is misplaced. Wisconsin employs a com-
pletely different mechanism to limit liability, and, as opposed
to Palsgraf, this policy determination is made after the requi-
site elements of duty and cause have been established.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
As noted above, the public policy determination is made by
the court at a point in time after the elements of duty and
40. See Kinsman v. Panek, 40 Wis. 2d 408, 417, 162 N.W.2d 27, 31 (1968); Pfeifer
v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 236-37, 55 N.W.2d 29, 33 (1952);
Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379 (1931).
41. Sampson v. Laskin, 66 Wis. 2d 318, 325-26, 224 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1975); BIas-
haski v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 175-76, 179 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1970).
42. Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 326, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970).
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causation have been established. In other words, the plaintiff
has already succeeded in proving his or her case. As a result,
the defendant faces great difficulty in avoiding liability
through judicial intervention before a complete determination
of the factual issues at trial. This aspect of timing distinguishes
the Wisconsin theory from both of the Palsgraf opinions.
Under the Andrews theory, the jury makes the determina-
tion of proximate cause, and liability results if the necessary
causation is present. In order to judicially limit liability, after
the jury has found the necessary proximate cause the court
must arbitrarily reverse that finding and declare that the requi-
site causation was lacking. Conversely, Cardozo made a judi-
cial determination of liability based on the existence or nonex-
istence of a duty at the outset, before a full trial. This method
affords the defendant a chance of success on either a motion
to dismiss43 or a motion for summary judgment.44 The minority
theory only allows the defendant a pretrial opportunity to limit
liability if the court declares as a matter of law that the neces-
sary cause is lacking.
Under the Wisconsin public policy approach, the court will
seldom make the policy limitation without a full factual resolu-
tion at trial. "While this court has decided the public policy
issue on demurrer, it is usually better practice to submit the
issue to the jury insofar as determining the issues of negligence
and causation in the same manner as in the ordinary case."''
The court's hesitance to invoke the policy limitation before
trial is evidenced by the fact that only a few factual situations
have given rise to such a pretrial limitation of liability. One of
these cases, Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,4" involved the
failure of a defendant doctor to diagnose the plaintiff's preg-
43. See Wis. STAT. § 802.06(2) (1975).
44. See Wis. STAT. § 802.08 (1975).
45. Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 779, 203 N.W.2d 15, 20 (1973). Similarly,
the court has noted:
The application of public policy considerations is solely a function of the
court. . . and does not in all cases require a full factual resolution of the cause
of action by trial before policy factors will be applied by the court. There may
well be cases, of course, where the issues are so complex, or factual connections
so attenuated, that a full trial must precede the court's determination.
Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d at 326-27, 179 N.W.2d at 888.
46. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). In addition, see Garcia v. Hargrove, 46
Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970), see note 26, wherein the court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint on public policy grounds.
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nancy. Deprived of the opportunity for an abortion, the plain-
tiff sued the doctor for the costs of raising the child. Applying
the Colla public policy factors, the court dismissed the plain-
tiff's complaint and found the defendant to be not liable as a
matter of law in this instance.
In another case, Hass v. Chicago & North Western
Railway,4" the plaintiff, a firefighter, sued a railroad for the
negligent starting of a fire. The plaintiff was injured in the
course of fighting the fire. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's demurrer, reasoning that to
allow liability in this instance contravened public policy. The
court noted that many fires are admittedly started by negligent
conduct, and to allow liability in such a case puts too great a
burden on homeowners or other owners of land, even though it
is perfectly foreseeable that firefighters will be summoned and
perhaps injured in fighting the blaze. Consequently, it ordered
the granting of the defendant's demurrer to the complaint on
the ground of public policy.
In the vast majority of cases, however, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has refused to limit liability on public policy con-
siderations without a full factual resolution of the issue at
trial."
Requiring a full trial of the issues obviously has a marked
effect upon defense strategy. With Wisconsin's broad definition
of duty, a claim of no duty may be successfully asserted by the
defendant upon a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment
only in those rare instances when no harm arising from the
defendant's conduct is foreseeable to anyone. If this lack of
duty, in the broad sense, is not clear from the pleadings, and
the necessary elements of breach, cause and harm are arguably
present, the defendant has little chance for a pretrial limitation
of liability via the motion to dismiss or summary judgment.
Nevertheless, if a legitimate public policy argument exists, se-
47. 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).
48. Id. at 327, 179 N.W.2d at 888. But cf. Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis. 2d 292, 249
N.W.2d 567 (1977) (involving essentially similar facts and approving of the Hass result,
but upholding a plaintiff's complaint where it was alleged that the homeowner failed
to warn the firefighter of a hidden hazard).
49. See, e.g., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W. 2d 132 (1976);
A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974);
Weiss v. Holman, 58 Wis. 2d 608, 207 N.W.2d 660 (1973); Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis.
2d 772, 203 N.W.2d 15 (1973).
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rious consideration should be given to making both those mo-
tions, the former on the pleadings and the latter on submitted
affidavits, if for no other reason than to lay a solid foundation
for seeking a judicial policy limitation after the trial.
Should those motions be denied, the defendant must also
consider the fact that the supreme court has permitted a
pretrial limitation of liability in only a handful of instances.
Numerous other cases have been returned for trial, leaving the
public policy determination for a later date. Obviously, if the
defendant proceeds to trial and the plaintiff fails to prove any
element of his or her case, the issue is moot, which is undoubt-
edly the court's underlying rationale in requiring a full trial
before making the policy determination.
Therefore, under the liberalized pleading rules the plain-
tiff is relatively assured of a trial without judicial intervention
limiting liability on policy grounds. That limitation is virtually
always made after a factual resolution of the issues fully clari-
fies any policy considerations which may affect the liability of
the defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite assertions to the contrary, the judicial limitation of
liability in Wisconsin does not follow either the Palsgraf major-
ity or minority opinions, but rather establishes a separate
mechanism based upon public policy considerations. Waube v.
Warrington" is the only Wisconsin case to specifically utilize
the foreseeable plaintiff rule of the majority, thereby allowing
the defendant to avoid liability in the first instance. However,
an analysis of Wisconsin negligence cases reveals that Waube
is also the only case to involve an unforeseeable plaintiff, which
places the decision along with Palsgraf in a class of "freak
accidents." 5' The Waube decision has never been overruled and
50. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.2d 497 (1935).
51. In discussing the viability of PaIsgraf as precedent, Dean Prosser noted,
We are in a field of freak accidents, of crazy concatenations of circumstances,
no one of which ever has been duplicated or ever will occur in exactly the same
way again. It is not likely that there will be another Mrs. Palsgraf before judg-
ment day. As a precedent her case is utterly worthless unless we can extract from
it some generalization, some guide to a method of dealing with freak accidents,
some prediction for the unpredictable. But freak accidents, in the aggregate,
follow no pattern at all; and even where some superficial resemblance can be
found, the details will vary so greatly and significantly from case to case that
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is still good law in these cases which can be classified as "freak
accidents," although the decision was later reclassified in
Kassa as primarily a public policy decision, quietly removing
the foreseeable plaintiff requirement of Palsgraf rom the realm
of "ordinary" negligence.
Although several later cases purport to adopt the Andrews
dissent, they succeed only in restating a definition of a duty
which had previously been established as the standard in Wis-
consin. Although differing from both, the public policy mecha-
nism created by the court has the same effect as both the
majority and minority opinions in Palsgraf-a judicial limita-
tion of liability above and beyond the jury determination of
negligence. Palsgraf is, at its very essence, a public policy deci-
sion, and the Wisconsin court simply altered the means em-
ployed to achieve the same result, without encountering or cre-
ating problems of declaring a foreseeable plaintiff to be unfore-
seeable or reversing a jury finding of proximate cause or cause
in fact. This judicial limitation of liability based on public
policy considerations should be recognized as just that, instead
of confusing the issue by claiming reliance upon a case decided
almost fifty years ago.
Ross A. ANDERSON
we may very well come to different conclusions. A rule for the unpredictable is
itself a contradiction in terms.
PROSSER, supra note 18, at 28; see also Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 358 N.E.2d
1019 (1976) (reaffirming the Palsgraf rationale, but emphasizing that the doctrine




AGREEMENTS: LET THE SIGNERS
BEWARE
I. APPLICABLE LAW
[Tihe remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or short-
comings, substantially affects the cause of action created by
the State. .... The change from a court of law to an arbitra-
tion panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury. . . . Arbitrators
do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their
proceedings is not as complete as it- is in a court trial; and
judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial re-
view of a trial. .... I
Arbitration is a consensual, private and nonjudicial
method of settling disputes which has important ramifications
on the legal rights of the parties involved. Because of the final-
ity usually accorded arbitration proceedings, the agreement to
arbitrate is, essentially, an agreement to waive many of the
protections one would have if litigating in a public forum. Yet,
despite the "informalities and looser approximations as to the
enforcement of their rights,"' arbitration can provide an eco-
nomic and efficient method of dispute resolution which meets
the needs and desires of the parties involved. Thus, long before
courts and legislatures endorsed arbitration as a matter of pub-
lic policy, businessmen were agreeing to arbitrate disputes.
A. Historical Development
Historically, courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration
agreements. At common law, agreements to arbitrate were re-
vocable until the time of the award: "[Elven if a submission
has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by deed or other-
wise, with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be
irrevocable, it is still revocable and countermandable, by either
party, before the award is actually made, although not after-
wards."' 3 By 1915 the various attitudes toward irrevocable
agreements to arbitrate future disputes had crystalized. The
1. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
2. Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1971).
3. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 1845).
